

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/PV.268  
28 June 1966  
ENGLISH

---

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND SIXTY-EIGHTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 28 June 1966, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD

(Sweden)

THE UNIVERSITY  
OF MICHIGAN

SEP 28 1966

DOCUMENT  
COLLECTION

cds. 66-536

66-18863

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A.F. AZEREDO da SILVEIRA  
Mr. G. de CARVALHO SILOS  
Mr. A. da COSTA GUIMARAES  
Mr. C.H. PAULINO PRATES

Bulgaria:

Mr. C. LUKANOV  
Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV  
Mr. D. POPOV  
Mr. D. KOSTOV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS  
Mr. S.F. RAE  
Mr. C.J. MARSHALL  
Mr. P.D. LEE

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. Z. CERNIK  
Mr. V. VAJNAR  
Mr. R. KLEIN

Ethiopia:

Mr. A. ZELLEKE  
Mr. B. ASSFAN

India:

Mr. V.C. TRIVEDI  
Mr. K.P. LUKOSE  
Mr. K.P. JAIN

Italy:

Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI  
Mr. S. AVETTA  
Mr. F. SORO

Mexico:

Mr. A. GOMEZ ROBLEDO  
Mr. M. TELLO MACIAS

Nigeria:

Mr. G.O. IJEWERE  
Mr. O.O. ADESOLA

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN  
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI  
Mr. B. KAJDY

Romania:

Mr. V. DUMITRESCU  
Mr. N. ECOBESCU  
Mr. E. GLASER  
Mr. C. UNGUREANU

Sweden:

Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD  
Mr. R. BOMAN  
Mr. V. ERICSSON

Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics:

Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN  
Mr. I.I. CHEPROV  
Mr. M.P. SHELEPIN  
Mr. Y.P. VIKTOROV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. H. KHALLAF  
Mr. A. OSMAN  
Mr. M. KASSEM  
Mr. A.A. SALAM

United Kingdom:

Mr. J.G. TAHOUDIN  
Miss E.J.M. RICHARDSON  
Mr. M.J.F. DUNCAN

United States of America:

Mr. W.C. FOSTER  
Mr. G. BUNN  
Mr. C.G. BREAM  
Mr. A. NEIDLE

Special Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative  
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. O. FREY

The CHAIRMAN (Sweden): I declare open the 268th plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Before calling on the first speaker, I should like to associate myself, on behalf of the Swedish delegation, with those previous speakers who have welcomed to this Committee the representative of Brazil, Ambassador Azeredo da Silveira.

Mr. BLUSZTAJN (Poland) (translation from French): First of all, I should like to associate myself with those who have spoken before me in order to welcome our new colleague the representative of Brazil, Ambassador Azeredo da Silveira, and to convey to him our sincere wishes for his success in carrying out his new task.

In accordance with what was decided at the first meeting of the present session of our Committee concerning the order of the questions to be considered (ENDC/PV.264, p.25), I should like to devote my statement today to the problem which -- and I believe we all agree on this point -- predominated in the discussion of our spring session and continues to be the subject of our concern at this summer session: the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

In the statements by representatives of Western countries which we have heard up to now, it has been repeatedly pointed out that we have very little time left and that we must speed up our work in order to reach an agreement as soon as possible. We have been asked by Mr. Foster and by Lord Chalfont not to arrive at the twenty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly empty-handed.

In their statements concerning the problem of non-proliferation, the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom have stressed more than once that this problem must be examined, not only from the point of view of the present situation, but also with due regard to the longer-range prospects, and that in such an examination we cannot allow ourselves to be dominated by specifically European problems but must also take into account the situation in other parts of the world. One even wondered whether the countries which feared the alleged nuclear ambitions of other States would feel safer if a non-proliferation treaty were not concluded.

The Polish delegation would like to believe that these observations made during our general debate are the expression of a sincere conviction that we must make a last effort to escape from the present impasse as quickly as possible.

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

No one will deny that, while we are carrying on our negotiations at Geneva, events are taking their course and time presses. This is so, not because the date of the twenty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly is near -- a date which we cannot postpone and at which, although we hope it will not be so, we shall have to submit a negative report -- but because the non-proliferation treaty has become a test of our ability to accomplish the tasks which have been entrusted to us.

We should like to believe that the most recent statements of the United States and United Kingdom delegations, which we heard last week (ENDC/PV.266, 267) were not intended to imply that the socialist countries are alone responsible for the lack of progress towards an agreement on non-proliferation, and also that they were not attempting to prepare public opinion to admit that no progress will be made as long as the socialist countries do not decide to modify their attitude and make new proposals. On the other hand, I must say that it would be unfair if I failed to draw attention to a positive note in the statement made by the representative of the United Kingdom, who, while supporting the position of the United States, at the same time indicated that we must find a compromise between the position of the United States and that of the Soviet Union. Lord Chalfont, in his speech of 16 June, observed:

"As they stand on paper, the relevant clauses of the Soviet draft and of the United States draft mark positions that are not so far apart that human ingenuity need despair of finding a compromise, given good will".

(ENDC/PV.265, p.9 )

I can assure the United Kingdom representative that the Polish delegation is always ready to seek a compromise and that we are in favour of compromise solutions. However, for a compromise to be possible, it is necessary to agree on the fundamental questions.

The problem which is of paramount importance to us is that of the definition of the word "control" introduced by the United States in the amendments to its draft treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (ENDC/152/Add.1). That definition grants to non-nuclear countries all rights of possession and disposition of atomic weapons, except the right to use such weapons, for which the previous agreement of the relevant atomic Power is required. To accept such a definition is tantamount, in our opinion, to opening the way to various bilateral solutions in the field of the

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

joint possession and disposition of nuclear weapons, or to multilateral solutions such as, for example, the multilateral nuclear force and the Atlantic nuclear force. As long as the United States delegation continues to insist on that concept, we see no possibility of compromise and therefore no possibility of agreement. And we are not the only ones to adopt such a position in that regard.

The statements made by many representatives of non-aligned countries this year during the spring session prove that they, too, are in favour of a clear and unequivocal solution to this problem, a solution that would be in accordance with the letter and spirit of resolution 2028 (XX) of the United Nations General Assembly. (ENDC/161). I should like to quote some extracts from the statements to which I have referred.

Speaking of sub-paragraph 2(a) of resolution 2028 (XX), the representative of India, Mr. Trivedi, stated on 15 February:

"The Indian delegation agrees with the Soviet delegation and others which have placed special emphasis on this principle. As we said in the twentieth session of the United Nations General Assembly, the treaty must prohibit all aspects of proliferation, direct or indirect, through military alliances or otherwise and in any form or shape. As a non-aligned nation we are unable to understand why members of military alliances should receive a special dispensation in the context of non-proliferation."

(ENDC/PV.240, p.16)

In his intervention on 5 May the representative of Nigeria stated:

"If we base our negotiations on the guide-lines provided by the United Nations, which we believe are clear enough, then we shall have no need to re-define what a non-proliferation treaty is or should be.

"We have received a clear mandate, in very simple and clear language, and my delegation believes that our duty is to work towards concluding a treaty strictly in line with this mandate." (ENDC/PV.262, p.16)

Referring to paragraph 2 of resolution 2028 (XX), the representative of Burma pointed out on 22 March:

"The aim of this paragraph, as we interpret it, is to foreclose all possible means of leakage of nuclear weapons to new entities and to see that no limitations are placed on preventing all such possibilities." (ENDC/PV.250, p.30).

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

The representative of the United Arab Republic stated during the meeting held on 3 March:

"My delegation considers that the present texts should be appropriately amended to take account of this type of dissemination, and to satisfy the requirement contained in the last sentence of the first principle set forth in sub-paragraph 2(a) of Assembly resolution 2028 (XX), which prohibits proliferation in any form." (ENDC/PV.245, p.8)

In the statement he made during the meeting of our Committee on 1 March, the representative of Brazil pointed out:

"In adopting resolution 2028 (XX) the General Assembly has conferred upon this Committee a well-defined mandate and at the same time has set forth the principles which should guide the drafting of the treaty on non-proliferation. All these principles -- contained in operative paragraph 2 of that resolution -- are of paramount importance, as the discussions which took place during the last session of the General Assembly showed." (ENDC/PV.244, p.14)

Lastly, Mr. Gomez Robledo stated that the Mexican delegation would --  
 " ... make every effort -- not lightheartedly, but as a duty -- to ensure that the treaty to be drafted by us embodies the general principles agreed upon in the United Nations." (ENDC/PV.242, p.14)

I apologize for taking up your time by reading the extracts I have just quoted, but I considered it necessary to do so, first of all because these quotations prove that the mandate of the United Nations General Assembly which binds us in respect of a treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is not the result of an alleged distortion which is said to characterize the outlook of the socialist countries of Europe, but that it also corresponds to the interests of countries situated in other continents. Secondly, I think that we can draw from these quotations the conclusion that the majority of countries would find it difficult to accept an agreement based on the United States concept of control.

The fact that the consequences of concluding an agreement in conformity with the United States proposals would be much more rapid and more important for Europe than for other parts of the world -- for it can be stated with certainty that, if

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

such an agreement were signed today, the Federal Republic of Germany would acquire atomic weapons tomorrow -- in no way diminishes our conviction that the question of joint disposition of nuclear weapons, the question of "nuclear sharing", is of no less concern to countries in other parts of the world. We have already drawn attention to the fact that the prospect of the joint possession and disposition of nuclear weapons could mean the end of the policy of non-alignment and involve the non-aligned countries of the world in the toils of a costly arms race.

We should like to point out that if we regard the problem of concluding a non-proliferation treaty as deserving of all the attention we devote to it, this is solely because the concept of "nuclear sharing" has not yet gone beyond the bounds of purely theoretical reflections. If the United States wants to take the path of practical steps in this field, it must take into account the fact that any discussion on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons would then become pointless. Why? For a very simple reason: so far as Europe is concerned, if the Federal Republic of Germany obtained nuclear weapons, it would no longer be possible for many European countries to renounce what is called the atomic option. As for the countries outside Europe, many of these would no doubt prefer to retain their freedom of action in case a country in their part of the world should obtain access, through "nuclear sharing", to atomic weapons.

We must realize that the prospect of gaps in a possible agreement strengthens the tendency of the non-nuclear countries to insist on a strict balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations between nuclear and non-nuclear Powers (A/RES/2028 (XX), p.3; ENDC/161), and to seek additional means of retaining the greatest possible freedom of action. Such an agreement, even if it could be concluded, could only result in a state of unstable equilibrium which would last as long as all the possibilities offered by these loop-holes were not exhausted. In this context we can understand the position of the delegations of the United States and the United Kingdom regarding the need to ensure an elastic procedure for revision of the treaty. In fact, we are convinced that such an agreement would quickly become devoid of substance. It would create a greater number of new problems to be solved than it would solve old ones.



(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

Our position in this respect has been quite clear from the beginning of the discussion of the problem of non-proliferation. We want a treaty which will guarantee to us that no one will ever be able, by any loop-hole, to obtain access to atomic weapons. We are prepared to submit to such restrictions if they are accepted by all the signatories of the agreement. We do not want privileges for ourselves, and we do not want to accord them to any country not possessing nuclear weapons. We do not favour in the least the establishment of a special and exceptional status for non-nuclear countries members of military alliances. The atomic weapon is not like other weapons; and it is precisely this truth that compels us to seek ways of preventing its dissemination. The conclusions that flow from this apply in equal measure to everyone -- both to the countries forming part of military blocs and to those which carry on a policy of non-alignment.

The delegation of the Soviet Union has been asked to reconsider its original draft treaty and to make some amendments to it. No one, to tell the truth, has so far stated precisely what direction these amendments should take. The discussion which has taken place on this subject leads us to suppose that the Western delegations would like the Soviet delegation to agree to open up loop-holes which would enable access to atomic weapons to be obtained by countries which do not possess them. We are not at all surprised that the Soviet delegation is unwilling to go along such a path. We fully support the position which it takes in this regard.

In the opinion of the Western delegations, acceptance of the United States concept of "nuclear sharing" involves perhaps a certain risk, but it is a price worth paying in exchange for the concluding of a non-proliferation treaty. I should like to make it clear that for us this price is too high, indeed prohibitive. And I believe that we are not alone in this evaluation.

Acceptance of the principles on which the draft treaty submitted by the Soviet Union (ENDC/164) is based involves no risk. What is needed is the will to reach agreement. Of course, that would involve the necessity of opposing categorically the unwarranted and dangerous atomic ambitions of one particular country. But is that really too high a price for a treaty which would put an end to the proliferation

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

of nuclear weapons and open up prospects for agreements in other fields?

It is with that question addressed to the Western delegations that I end my remarks.

Mr. FOSTER (United States of America): First, I should like to say that I have listened with great interest to the comments of the Polish representative. I think that he has adopted a business-like approach to our problems. I hope that in some of my later remarks he may find answers to some of his questions. We shall study his remarks with care and perhaps respond to them at a later date.

I should like to mention that my delegation has with it in the room today, as an official adviser, Senator Frank Carlson of Kansas. He is a senior member of the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee and has long been interested in disarmament and in the work of this Conference. The United States delegation is honoured by his presence here.

In our review of past statements on non-proliferation, one particular problem stands out. That problem is that obstacles to the successful negotiation of a treaty are being added rather removed as our discussions here proceed. The negotiation of a non-proliferation treaty is no easy task; if it were, we would not be here continuing to struggle with our assignment some five years after the acceptance and adoption of the Irish resolution (A/RES/1665/(XVI)) in 1961 at the General Assembly of the United Nations. The treaty would long since have been concluded. Given the considerable difficulty which already existed in 1961, we should not now be looking for additional difficulties. That is particularly true since, with the passing of time, the need for a non-proliferation treaty has become even more urgent. We should be seeking ways to eliminate obstacles, by understanding them and by finding ways around them. We should not be adding to them.

Unfortunately, changes in the Soviet position seem to have added new obstacles. Last September Mr. Tsarapkin declared that one obstacle stood in the way of a non-proliferation treaty: that was, he said, the proposed NATO multilateral force and similar plans (ENDC/PV.234, pp.29, 30). In the fall, however, the Soviet Union proposed a draft non-proliferation treaty (ENDC/164) with language so broad that it could be said to bar even consultation between NATO allies in preparation for their defence against possible nuclear attack or deployment of United States nuclear weapons under United States control on the territory of NATO allies.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

Article I of the Soviet draft treaty can be interpreted to bar participation by non-nuclear allies in decisions concerning where nuclear weapons belonging to their nuclear allies might be emplaced on their territory. That is clearly unreasonable. The United States can hardly deny its allies a voice in determining where its nuclear weapons are to be stored on their territory.

Article I of the Soviet draft can also be interpreted as prohibiting the transfer to non-nuclear allies of any information concerning use of nuclear weapons. This would prevent any meaningful allied consultations about what to do in the event of a nuclear attack. How can any alliance prepare to defend itself against nuclear attack unless its members can consult about the effects resulting from the use of nuclear weapons by an adversary?

We do not, of course, know what goes on in the case of the Warsaw Pact, for the Soviet representative refuses to say. We do know that Soviet-built delivery vehicles capable of using nuclear weapons have been seen with the armed forces of certain Soviet allies. Does the Soviet Union give its allies no information on the use of these weapons or on how to defend against the use of similar weapons? Does the Soviet Union permit its allies no voice in deciding where nuclear weapons are stored on their territory?

There have been repeated reports of meetings of defence ministers of Warsaw Pact members. Do those ministers never talk among themselves about the use of nuclear weapons by the Soviet Union or any other country?

We, of course, cannot answer those questions, and the Soviet Union refuses to. However, we can point out that three serious Soviet obstacles to the negotiation of a non-proliferation treaty seem to have been raised, whereas before there appeared to be only one. As I have indicated, the two new obstacles appear to be prohibitions against deployment on allied territory and against consultation among allies.

On 8 December 1965, in a speech to the Supreme Soviet, Foreign Minister Gromyko confirmed Soviet opposition to both consultation and deployment, and he did so in a speech discussing Soviet views on non-proliferation. At our meeting of 29 March (ENDC/PV.252) and at our last meeting (ENDC/PV.267), Mr. Roshchin made statements which seemed more consistent with Foreign Minister Gromyko's speech than with Mr. Tsarapkin's statement of last September. It appears, therefore, that the Soviet Union may indeed have "raised the ante" from what it was last summer.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

The representative of the Soviet Union has stated a number of times -- most recently at our last meeting (ibid., p. ) -- that no delegation has criticized the Soviet draft as inadequate for closing all routes to proliferation. However, that misstates the problem. It is easy to design treaty clauses which are broad enough to cover all possibilities of proliferation, and even much that is not proliferation. For example, a treaty clause could be proposed providing that no national of a non-nuclear weapon State could ever come closer than 100 miles to a nuclear weapon. The question could then be put forth: does that proposal not bar all routes to the spread of nuclear weapons?

It merely obfuscates our debate for the representative of the Soviet Union to ask why his Government's text is insufficient to close all avenues to proliferation. A minute ago I said that the Soviet draft seemed to prohibit deployment on the territory of non-nuclear weapon States, and consultation about nuclear defence between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon States. Those are matters which it is wholly unrealistic to prohibit in a non-proliferation treaty. To ask whether a treaty which prohibits them also closes all loop-holes is to put a question of interest only to scholars, for such a treaty will never be adopted.

At earlier meetings my delegation has raised various questions about the realism of the Soviet approach. Does the Soviet Union really believe that consultation among allies about nuclear strategy should be prohibited? Does it intend to prevent allies from sharing any information regarding defence against use of nuclear weapons? Does it intend to change existing arrangements for deployment of nuclear weapons within alliances? Those are examples of the questions we should like to have answered. Unfortunately, we have received no elucidation from the Soviet representative.

At our last meeting Mr. Roshchin (ibid., p. ) described three objections regarding our draft treaty (ENDC/152 and Add.1). The first relates to why the United States definition of control of nuclear weapons hinges on right or ability to fire nuclear weapons. We have answered that point before. Most recently, at our meeting of 10 May, I said that the purpose of having any weapon, unfortunately, was to be prepared to fire it or to threaten to fire it if that should ever become necessary; and I continued: "So long as the effective decision to use nuclear weapons is left in the hands of an existing nuclear weapon State, there is no proliferation." (ENDC/PV.263, p.14).

(Mr. Foster, United States)

The crucial and vital purpose of non-proliferation is to lessen the chance that the world will ever be visited by the catastrophe of nuclear war. That, as we have said over and over again, explains our purpose in focusing our treaty definition on the firing of nuclear weapons.

Mr. Roshchin's second objection concerned the need for retention of a veto in a non-proliferation treaty. That point also has been answered before. At our meeting of 10 May I explained that the United States would retain its veto because, in fact, the United States does intend to maintain control over its own nuclear weapons (*ibid.*, p.13). Frankly, the Soviet representative's criticism of our draft treaty in that regard is baffling. Is the Soviet representative suggesting that the United States should not retain its veto over its own nuclear weapons? Even if the Soviet Union is suggesting this, which I must say I doubt, I can assure this Committee that the United States is a fully responsible nuclear Power and that it will not eliminate its veto over the use of its own nuclear weapons. Perhaps the word "veto" does not convey a sufficiently strong sense of prohibition in Russian. To us, in this instance, it means that the United States remains affirmatively in control of its own weapons, no matter where they may be. I shall have more to say on that a little later in these remarks.

Finally, the Soviet representative has objected to the clause in our draft treaty forbidding an increase in the total number of States and associations of States having control of nuclear weapons. He has charged that that clause somehow permits wide-open proliferation to innumerable States. We have explained before why that is not so. For example, during our meeting of 31 March we explained how an association could receive control of nuclear weapons only if one of the existing nuclear weapon States completely relinquished all its own nuclear arsenal (ENDC/PV.253, p.12). We explained that there would not be an increase, even by one, in the number of centres able to take the awesome decision to fire nuclear weapons. Clearly it is fanciful to suggest that a dozen or more countries could become nuclear Powers when there is an unequivocal prohibition in the treaty against any increase, even by one, in the number of States or associations having control over nuclear weapons.

The three specific provisions of the United States draft to which the representative of the Soviet Union objected have been explained by the United States delegation many times before. However, the Soviet representative has refused to answer our questions about the practical and realistic application of the Soviet draft with respect to military alliances.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

Mr. Roshchin also contended that the only prohibition in the United States draft was on unilateral use of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear weapon States; that all a non-nuclear weapon State would have to do to obtain nuclear weapons in its territory was to promise not to use them without nuclear-weapon State consent: and that promises of that kind were easily broken.

In the first place, one needs only to read the first article of the United States draft to find many prohibitions in it beyond those on the use of nuclear weapons. In addition to the bar to transfers of control, there are prohibitions on assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or in their testing. There are prohibitions relating not only to manufacturing but to acquisition of nuclear weapons "otherwise", that is, by any other means. There is also the prohibition of "any other action" which would cause an increase in the number of nuclear weapon entities in the world. There are thus many prohibitions other than the one on the final use of nuclear weapons.

Contrary to a possible implication in Mr. Roshchin's statement at our last meeting (ENDC/PV.267, p.6) our NATO allies do not obtain, store, deploy, transport, aim or attach to missiles or aircraft any United States nuclear weapons. Like the Soviet Union's Warsaw Pact allies, United States allies do receive training in dual-capability weapon systems, such as artillery and fighter-bomber aircraft. However, United States nuclear weapons remain firmly in United States hands.

In the second place, the Soviet representative's argument overlooks an important word in the United States definition of control. That word is "ability". Under the United States draft, no non-nuclear weapon State could be given the independent "ability" to fire nuclear weapons, whether or not it has torn up its agreement not to fire them.

In this connexion, I wish to call the Soviet representative's attention to the efforts the United States has made to see to it that no one other than the President of the United States has the ability to order firing of United States nuclear weapons. As President Johnson put it in an address in September 1964:

"The release of nuclear weapons would come by Presidential decision alone" --  
I repeat: "by Presidential decision alone." "Complex codes and electronic devices prevent any unauthorized action. Every further step along the way from decision to destruction is governed by the two-man rule. Two or more men must act independently and must decide the order has been given. They must independently take action. An elaborate system of checks and counterchecks, procedural and mechanical, guards against any unauthorized nuclear bursts."

(Mr. Foster, United States)

The President went on to describe the additional electronic protective devices which have recently been inserted into United States weapons in situations where unauthorized firing might conceivably be possible. He said: "These are electro-mechanical locks which must be opened by secret combination before action at all is possible...". Thus the United States has taken every step that brilliant designers have been able to devise to ensure that no unauthorized person, be he a national of the United States or of any other country, can acquire the ability to fire United States weapons. The word "ability" was inserted into the United States definition of control in recognition of the fact that devices and procedures have been devised for that purpose.

Finally, the United States does not intend to delegate the control over its weapons which these procedures and devices now place in the hands of its President. The most recent statement on this subject was the testimony before Congress given on 22 June by the Secretary of Defense, Mr. McNamara. He agreed with a statement that in no case is it an element of United States policy that there should be control of United States nuclear weapons by a non-nuclear weapon State. He emphasized that the United States "does not have plans for delegating control over nuclear weapons to other single nations or groups of nations."

Given those facts, there should be no misunderstanding of the United States draft and no need to raise any of the obstacles which the Soviet Union has placed in the path to the successful conclusion of a treaty.

I should like to turn now to another type of hurdle which seems increasingly to get in our way. This hurdle is the demand that a non-proliferation treaty contain obligations on the nuclear weapon States to cease all nuclear weapon tests, to halt production of fissionable material for weapons, to stop making nuclear delivery vehicles, to put a ceiling on numbers of nuclear weapons or vehicles, or even to begin nuclear disarmament.

The underlying concept of non-proliferation has been well understood for many years. Non-proliferation, like the cessation of nuclear weapon tests or the cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons, has been viewed as a collateral measure designed to accomplish a specific but limited purpose. Like all collateral measures, a reason for its existence as a separate measure is that it covers only one subject, one upon which agreement may be possible before it can be reached on broader and more complex issues.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

The purpose of non-proliferation has always been the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons to countries which do not have their own nuclear weapons. That purpose was articulated in the Irish resolution of 1961 which called for agreement to prevent "an increase in the number of States possessing nuclear weapons" (A/RES/1665 (XVI)).

I know of no reason for believing that since 1961 the inherent concept of non-proliferation has been transmuted into something else -- for example, a cut-off of production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons, a freeze of strategic delivery vehicles, or nuclear disarmament. Incorporating such measures into a non-proliferation treaty, in our opinion, is not required in any way to meet the objectives of United Nations General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX) (ENDC/161). That resolution deals with a treaty on non-proliferation, not one on nuclear disarmament or some other subject.

More important, the interpretation of that resolution as a call for linking additional, more difficult measures to a non-proliferation treaty is inconsistent with the fundamental purpose of the resolution. It was designed to give support and direction towards the urgent conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty. It seems inconceivable to us that the overwhelming majority of the United Nations Members that supported the resolution had in mind burdening non-proliferation negotiations with the task of resolving the difficult problems raised by other measures. Certainly the United States had no such thing in mind when it voted for the resolution.

We have urged the original and well-understood meaning of non-proliferation for a fundamental reason. That reason brings us back to the underlying theme of my statement: we must not add new difficulties to a task which is already difficult enough.

We categorically support agreement on a comprehensive test ban and a verified cut-off of production of fissionable material for weapon purposes with a demonstrated destruction of nuclear weapons. We have proposed -- for urgent exploration -- a freeze of the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (ENDC/165). We have stated our genuine willingness to explore the possibility of significant reductions in the numbers of these vehicles if progress can be made towards the freeze. Each of these measures would help to keep the ability to trigger nuclear war from spreading to even more countries. Each would help to limit the danger and destruction of



(Mr. Foster, United States)

nuclear war. But each of those measures is more complex than a non-proliferation treaty. For example, each would involve inspection on Soviet territory.

Those who have proposed the incorporation of additional arms control measures into the body of a non-proliferation treaty must surely understand that such a proposal, if acted upon, would result in the postponement of a non-proliferation treaty. That would be to the advantage of none of us. Certainly the non-nuclear weapon States will not be more secure if, in addition to the present nuclear weapon States, there come into being many more with nuclear weapons. I need not state again all the reasons that the international community, through the United Nations, has year after year given for an agreement on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

We of course recognize the seriousness and the legitimacy of the concern of the non-nuclear Powers for their security. In fact provisions in the United States draft treaty -- and, I believe, also in the Soviet draft treaty -- are directly relevant. In each of these treaties there is a clause permitting withdrawal if the supreme interests of a country are jeopardized by extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the treaty. We have not previously talked about withdrawal. In part, I suppose, that results from the general reluctance to talk about divorce before there has been a marriage. However, matters of delicacy should not prevent us from understanding fundamental problems.

The United States draft would permit a non-nuclear weapon State to withdraw if the development of nuclear weapons by a particular nuclear weapon State had proceeded so far that, under all the circumstances, the supreme interests of the non-nuclear weapon State were jeopardized; or, if the policies of a particular nuclear weapon State became so hostile and menacing that the non-nuclear weapon State concluded, under all the relevant circumstances, that its supreme interests were jeopardized, it could then withdraw.

Recourse to a withdrawal clause would be an extreme measure. Before it took place, many other developments could occur. Of most importance is the fact that, after a non-proliferation treaty had been concluded, all the parties could take steps to enhance their own security. A variety of steps could be considered, and differing steps could be taken, depending on the interests and capabilities of individual participants or groups of participants. On the broadest level, I would recall that Ambassador Goldberg stated in the United Nations on 23 September 1965: "Action by the Assembly can be a useful part of such assurances." (A/PV.1334, p.36) It is

(Mr. Foster, United States)

to be noted that he referred to General Assembly action as a "useful part" of security assurances. Additional steps might certainly be taken, depending on the wishes of the parties concerned.

I do not mean to convey that my delegation has any magic formula for the very difficult question of security in relation to non-proliferation. As we all know, the matter is complicated by the apparent determination of Peking to proceed with nuclear development as quickly as possible, while flouting the basic standards of international conduct and ignoring or berating all disarmament proposals made by other nations.

However, despite the difficulties, there are possibilities for constructive action. The negotiation of a non-proliferation treaty is clearly such a possibility. It continues to be in the security interests of us all. By itself, naturally, the treaty will not solve all security problems; but no one measure ever will.

We have little time remaining in which to make progress on a treaty before the opening of the twenty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly. Let us not create new obstacles. Let us instead use our intelligence, our energies and our imagination to overcome those already facing us. In that way progress will be possible.

In conclusion, I should like to read from a letter from the President of the United States addressed to Senator John O. Pastore, who originated the resolution recently adopted unanimously by the United States Senate supporting measures to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons:

"In my message to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee at Geneva last January<sup>1/</sup>, I noted that your resolution and similar resolutions in the House supporting measures to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons 'are an indication of the importance that the people of the United States attribute to such measures'.

"Now your resolution has been approved by the Senate without one dissenting vote. This overwhelming expression of sentiment is more than an indication of the support of the American people for our unremitting efforts to stop further proliferation of nuclear weapons. It is clear and unequivocal evidence of the depth of our commitment. As such, it is there for the whole world to see. I know it will reinforce Mr. Foster's position

(Mr. Foster, United States)

at Geneva, where on my instructions he will shortly renew our urgent pursuit of a treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

"It is a source of great strength to me to know that, in dealing with this vitally urgent problem, I have the support of the United States Senate.

"Sincerely,

"Lyndon B. Johnson"

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 268th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Peder Hammarskjöld, representative of Sweden.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Poland and the United States.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 30 June 1966, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 11.35 a.m.

